Usually, a peace agreement is reached between two or more countries at war. A common practice is to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table before drafting such an agreement. Dialogue typically involves debate, disputes, accusations, and counter-accusations—this is natural. Ultimately, peace agreements end wars through compromise and give-and-take. However, when one side decisively wins and the other loses, the victor often imposes its terms on the defeated party.
Somehow similar principle applies to peace agreements between disputing groups within a country as well. Such processes pass through intense arguments before concluding in compromise. Compared to interstate agreements, internal peace processes can be far more complex and cumbersome. A prominent example is Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), signed on November 21, 2006, between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists, which formally ended a decade-long civil war. The agreement was signed by then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda).
But this agreement was deeply flawed, as it fell short of established international precedents and principles of peace-making. The CPA was essentially a two-man consensus between Prime Minister Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda, despite the fact that the Maoists had waged a violent insurgency against the state. During the conflict, they engaged in extortion, looting, destruction of public and private property, and the killing of security personnel and civilians. In response, the state had mobilized its full capacity to counter the insurgency and protect its citizens.
The conflict that lasted for ten years was primarily between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during the reigns of King Birendra and later King Gyanendra. India’s role in the peace process was significant and unmistakable. Historically, the 1950’s political settlement between the Nepali Congress and the Rana regime had also been brokered by India. However, in that case, both parties were directly involved.
In contrast, the 12-point agreement brokered by India in 2005 excluded His Majesty’s Government altogether. This exclusion raises the doubt that the likely objective was not peace but the removal of the monarchy by uniting the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists against the King. The aim appeared to be the consolidation of India’s influence over Nepal’s political and administrative structures. Had peace been the true objective, what prevented a “friendly neighbor” from ensuring the participation of the sitting government in such a crucial agreement?
What empowered Prime Minister Koirala and the Maoists to sign the 12-point agreement unilaterally? Why were the Nepal Army and representatives of His Majesty’s Government excluded from a peace accord of such magnitude?
In reality, the CPA neither served the genuine interests of the warring parties nor those of Nepal as a sovereign nation. Rather, it was the result of a long-hatched act of perfidy against Nepal, planting the seeds of future conflict. The recent Gen-Z movement in Nepal can be traced, in part, to the unresolved contradictions of the CPA. Had the peace process genuinely included the government as a stakeholder, it would probably not serve the interests of foreign powers to dismantle the monarchy and to remove Hinduism from the constitutional identity of the state. A truly inclusive peace agreement between the government and the Maoists would have necessitated open discussions on the future of the monarchy, Hinduism and federalism. These issues could have been settled then through genuine give-and-take. ‘Secular state’ would probably not be inserted in the constitution through procedural maneuvering. If the peace process had involved Nepal’s real stakeholders, it could have resulted in a genuine win-win outcome.
Instead, the CPA violated international standards of peace agreements and conflict management norms. It has contributed to prolonged political instability, economic hardship, and renewed social unrest. Thousands of Nepalis continue to leave the country daily in search of livelihoods abroad. The Gen-Z movement persists, reflecting deep public frustration. Political leaders have commodified land and citizenship, while power centers have rendered the nation unstable—like a country trembling under a constant earthquake.
Nepal today seems to be crying under the weight of violence and disorder. It is astonishing to hear certain intellectuals, former prime ministers, and even retired Nepal Army generals describe the CPA as an exemplary model of global peace. Some have even promoted this “Nepal model” internationally, including in Colombia. What could be more absurd? This is nothing but deception—both self-inflicted and imposed—upon Nepal.
One can only hope that such a peace agreement is never replicated elsewhere in the world. When the CPA was finalized, King Gyanendra was effectively silenced. Even more unfortunate was the silence of the Nepal Army leadership at such a critical moment. The entire peace process amounted to the humiliation and intimidation of the national army. In that sense, the Army’s failure to speak up was a grave blunder with lasting consequences.
The CPA has proven to be Nepal’s Pandora’s box. Independent intellectuals and experts in conflict management will, in time, acknowledge that what occurred under the banner of the Nepali Comprehensive Peace Agreement was deeply unfortunate—and profoundly damaging to the nation.
Prem Singh Basnyat, historian and researcher, is brigadier general (retired) of Nepal Army.
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