Nepal has come to a point where it is necessary to seriously reconsider the long-standing practice of appointing ministers from among sitting MPs. The political instability in the country, the short lifespan of governments, frequent changes of power, and growing disillusionment among citizens have clearly indicated that the current structure is not effective. With the loss of trust among the people, growing resentment among the younger generation, and weak trust in political leadership, it is no longer in the interest of democracy to continue the old practice. Such a change is not just a wish or aspiration out of necessity, but has become an inevitable demand of the time.
The current pattern of appointing ministers from MPs has been shown to create a number of challenges and weaknesses. First, MPs’ primary responsibilities—lawmaking, parliamentary oversight, public representation—can be undermined by the executive responsibilities of ministers. Second, ministerial ambitions make elections extremely expensive, donor-dependent, and self-centered. Third, as the boundaries between the executive and the legislature blur, the effectiveness of both branches is weakened. This leaves the government run by those who are supposed to make laws, which creates a fertile environment for corruption.
In addition, since many ministers in Nepal are also MPs, ideological, policy, and long-term debates in parliament are weak. When ministers appear in parliament, they prioritize defending their ministries, which blocks critical debate. This reduces the quality of parliament and slows down democratic development.
All these weaknesses make one thing clear—the practice of limiting ministers to sitting MPs has lost its ability to solve systemic problems. The need for a new political structure, a clear division of roles, and an executive leadership based on professional competence is even more pressing today. If Nepal wants to strengthen democratic institutions, improve good governance, and restore public trust, it is now imperative to rethink this old practice. Elections have become extremely expensive and competitive in Nepal. It has become almost impossible for candidates of modest economic status to contest elections, as winning an election requires a large sum of money, an influential support group, or powerful donors. In the 2079 elections, many candidates were publicly reported to have taken out large loans using personal assets as collateral, or to rely on funds of unclear origin. This has turned elections into an arena of economic competition rather than a democratic process of selecting people’s representatives.
Even after the election, they cannot be challenged. The burden of huge expenses and debt continues to haunt them even after becoming MPs. For this reason, many public representatives focus on the aspiration of becoming ministers, because the position of minister provides salary, allowances, the ability to influence the budget, and power related to government contracts. These opportunities are more likely to be used for personal gain. On the other hand, donors who invest money in elections also invest in the hope of obtaining policy benefits, concessions, or government contracts. In this way, when political positions are transformed into a means of personal gain and fulfilling donor interests, widespread institutional corruption appears to have increased.
If a provision is made to prevent members of the House of Representatives from becoming ministers, it will help eliminate many distortions. First, the attitude of MPs to seek office to ‘return’ the money invested in the elections is reduced. Second, MPs can focus on policy formulation, drafting, and people’s problems, which makes parliamentary work more effective. Third, skilled people, subject experts, and people with technical skills from outside parliament can be brought into the role of ministers. Such experts can run the ministry in a professional manner, which helps ensure good governance, transparency, and long-term policy stability.
Thus, separation of roles can significantly contribute to strengthening the democratic system by reducing electoral money politics and corruption.
Corruption in Nepal is not a minor aberration, but a deep-rooted structural problem. The fact that Nepal scored only 34 out of 100 in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, and ranked 100th out of 180 countries, is a clear indicator of the seriousness of this crisis. Such a poor score indicates that there is a lack of transparency, lack of accountability, and widespread abuse of political power in government agencies. From the Bhutanese refugee case to major corruption scandals involving former prime ministers, ministers, and high-ranking officials, these incidents have not only shaken public trust, but also generated deep resentment towards the system, which this year turned into a widespread mass movement. The change of government within 28 hours under the pressure of this movement is evidence of serious dissatisfaction and distrust in the political system.
One of the root causes of this problem is the concentration of the roles of parliamentarians and ministers in the same person. When the legislature and executive power are in the same hands, the oversight, control and checks and balances of parliament are weakened. When the executive is run by the people who make the laws themselves, the systemic barriers that can prevent wrong decisions, abuse and corruption are lost. This is why the seeds of corruption are sown deep and over time it takes an institutional form.
To get out of this problem, a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature is now essential. The practice of bringing in people with specialized expertise, administrators, technical or management skills from outside the parliament to the post of ministers focuses the parliamentary members on their real legislative role – making laws, debating, and closely monitoring the work of the government. When experts run the ministry, the chances of policies being rational, fact-based and long-term increase. In this way, professionalism, transparency and good governance are strengthened in the country.
Such reforms may require constitutional amendments, but many improvements can be made by making immediate changes in political behavior—such as implementing a policy that prioritizes qualifications, experience, and professional standards in ministerial appointments. Nepal can no longer sustain an electoral-political system that is dominated by money, donor influence, and power. A clear separation of the roles of parliamentarians and ministers would not only strengthen democracy, but would also strike at the root cause of corruption. If concrete steps are not taken now, there is a strong possibility that a new mass movement will arise. Therefore, urgent, firm, and effective reforms are needed to save the country’s democratic future.
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